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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
Road Commission, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
BETTILYON'S INC., and NOLAN 
OSWALD, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Statement of Appellants, as set out in their Brief, 
is adequate. We would but add that the action in condem-
nation was commenced and service of process made on 
the 22nd day of July, 1963. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
The case, with respect to the fair value of the land 
condemned as well as damages to remaining property not 
taken, was tried before a jury of eight in June, 1964. A 
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verdict was returned and judgment entered for the Appel-
lants and against the Respondent for $130,000.00 (R. 18, 
19 & 20). The judgment has been paid and a receipt given 
(R. 61, 62). Certain factors of special damage raised by 
Appellants (a part of which underlie this Appeal) were, 
at the time of the trial by jury, reserved for subsequent 
determination. Upon later hearing in August, 1964, the 
Trial Court, after all interests had rested their cases, de-
nied the claims of special damage of Appellants and granted 
the State's Motion for Involuntary Dismissal (R. 63, 64). 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law thereon were 
also entered pursuant to Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure (R. 72-78). 
The Motion of Appellants for a new trial on damages 
was denied by the lower Court (R. 77) and a final Order 
of Condemnation was thereupon entered vesting in the Re-
spondent, State of Utah, the fee interest in the demised 
premises (R. 65-67). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant's attempt to appeal from the Order denying 
a new trial(see Notice of Appeal, R. 79) is in vain, since 
that Order, as a matter of law, is not final from which an 
appeal may be sustained. Little v. Gorman, 19 Utah 63, 
114 Pac. 321 (1911); White v. Pease, 15 Utah 161, 49 Pac. 
255 (1897). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Appellants, while argumentative and 
largely without record designation, is substantially accur-
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ate. The Court will note and distinguish the facts from the 
conclusions and arguments therein set forth. 
To crystallize as well as add to the Appellants' State-
ment, Respondent submits the following set of facts as rep-
resentative: 
(a) Appellants, or their predecessors, purchased 35 
acres of land (of which the condemned parcels 
constitute 12 acres) of undeveloped land in 1959 
(R. 159). 
(b) Appellants petitioned the Salt Lake County Plan-
ning Commission in 1960 to approve a subdivision 
plat of the property (R. 164, Ex. D-29-2). A 
hearing for final approval of the plan was sched-
uled before the Planning Commission in Decem-
ber of 1960 (Ex. D-29-5). 
(c) The State Road Commission in the late 1950's and 
early 1960's, had under consideration the develop-
ment of Interstate Highway 415, generically re-
ferred to as the Belt Route Freeway (Ex. D-29-1 
& 4, R. 223-235). In 1960, the said facility was 
in initial planning status and although the "cor-
ridor location" had not been firmly established, 
it was anticipated that a portion of Appellants' 
property would be required for the Freeway (R. 
235, 236). 
(d) Because of the anticipated need, Road Commission 
personnel in December, 1960, requested that the 
County Planning Commission attempt to delay 
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development on such land "as provided by law", 
(Ex. D-29-5, R. 275) and "to use whatever legal 
means" available to the County to guard the area 
within the proposed Freeway right-of-way (Ex. 
D-29-9). 
(e) Pursuant to County Ordinance 9-7-3, as revised, 
the Planning Commission on January 10, 1961, 
withheld final approval of Appellants' subdivision 
plat for a period of one calendar year, to enable 
the Respondent to buy the needed land (Ex. D-
29-9, R. 275). 
(f) The Appellants next petitioned the Planning Com-
mission for final approval of the subdivision plat 
in May, 1963 (Ex. D-29-14, R. 275). 
(g) Meanwhile, the Road Commission in 1961 and 
1962, proceeded with further location studies and 
programming of the highway facility, including 
engineering and right-of-way design, and other 
technical and administrative measures of the 
Project (R. 234-241; Ex. D-29-11, R. 275). 
(h) There is accord among Appellants and Respon-
dent that the planning, programming and design 
of the public improvement and the purchasing of 
right-of-way therefor, was accomplished by the 
Road Commission in a reasonable manner and 
without unnecessary delay (R. 181, 182, 238-240). 
(i) The Road Commission and Bettilyon's negotiated 
for the purchase of the properties ultimately con-
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demned in the forepart of 1963, but without reach-
ing an accommodation (Ex. D-29-18, R. 275). 
(j) The Respondent commenced this action to con-
demn a fraction of the Appellants' property in 
July of 1963. 
The clearest statement of fact which weighs upon this 
Court is that entered by the trial Court in its Findings of 
Fact on the matter (R. 72, 73, 73A, 74, and 74A). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO DESIG-
NATE THE NATURE OF THE ERROR AL-
LEGEDLY COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT IN THE MATTER. 
It is apparent from Appellant's Brief that they have 
misconceived the essence of the appeal and the function 
of this Court therein. A reading of the same would suggest 
that the matter is presently under consideration by a court 
of original jurisdiction for trial de novo as to both fact and 
law. The Brief is void of citation of the claimed error com-
mitted by the lower Court and of the ensuing prejudice. 
For that matter, the Brief lacks averment that the trial 
Judge erred at all. Overlooked is the fundamental principal 
that a designation of error occasioned by the trial Court 
is necessary to this review. The fact is that the issues which 
Appellants raise were submitted by full-fledged trial to the 
lower Court. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
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were, upon special hearing, entered. Yet no reference to 
either is made in Appellants' Brief. 
The appellate jurisdiction of this Court requires that 
it not sit as the original arbiter of the fact and law. Arti-
cle 8, Section 9, Utah Constitution. In that the instant suit 
is one at law, the review is focused only upon the errors 
of law committed by the trial Court. 78-2-2 U. C. A., 1953; 
Whittaker v. Ferguson, 16 Utah 240, 51 Pac. 980 (1898); 
Van Leeuwen v. Huffaker, 78 Utah 521, 5 P. 2d 714 (1931). 
Such error ought to be set out by Appellants in their Brief, 
less it be abandoned. Berg v. Otis Elevator, et al., 64 Utah 
518, 231 Pac. 832 (1924). 
POINT II. 
RESPONDING TO APPELLANTS' POINT I, 
THE FACTS OF THE CASE DO NOT MANI-
FEST A TAKING, ACTUAL OR CONSTRUC-
TIVE, OF APPELLANTS' LAND IN 1961. 
For lack of better specification, we assume that the 
nub of Appellants' first Point (that the Road Commission 
caused a legal "taking" of their property in 1961) is Con-
clusion of Law No. 7 entered by the trial Court. It is there 
provided: 
"7. That the acts of the Road Commission of 
the State of Utah in requesting the Planning Com-
mission of Salt Lake County to defer action on the 
proposed Random Woods Subdivision plat did not 
constitute a taking of the Defendants' property 
without compensation and was not in violation of 
the 5th and 14th Amdt. to the Fed. Constitution or 
Art. 1, Sec. 7 and 22 of the Utah Constitution." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The claim is made that the Respondent, by its request 
to the Planning Commission in December of 1960 to with-
hold approval of the proposed subdivision plat, worked a 
non-physical expropriation of the subject property as of 
the date when the Planning Commission reserved approval. 
Upon that basis, they ask for relief that the Judgment on 
the verdict of the jury, entered June 29, 1964, carry inter-
est at six per cent (6%) per annum from January 10, 1961, 
to the date of its entry. (See Apps.' Brief, Conclusion p. 
33). 
To begin with, if under these facts the Appellants' land 
were taken in the constitutional sense, it is quite clear that 
the proximate cause was not the request of the State Road 
Commission at all; rather, it was the action taken by the 
County Planning Commission pursuant to County Ordi-
nance, 9-7-3. That Ordinance contains the proviso: 
"(1) When a preliminary plat is submitted 
for the division of property a part or all of which 
is deemed suitable by the Planning Commission for 
schools, parks, playgrounds, or other areas for pub-
lic use, the Planning Commission shall apprise the 
proper agency in writing of the property owner's 
intent to subdivide. / / any such areas proposed for 
public use have not been freely dedicated to the 
public by the owner or have not been purchased at 
a fair price by the proper agency within one (1) 
year from the date of notification, such areas may 
be divided into lots and sold in accordance with the 
provisions of this Title." (Emphasis ours.) 
The province of the Respondent under the Ordinance 
is recommendatory only. The power to act, in the first 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and last analysis, rested with the Planning Commission. 
That Agency, and not the Road Commission, resolved to 
delay subdivision approval for one year. Albeit, the ques-
tion of proximate cause need not be decided here for the 
acts of which complaint is lodged, whether by the Respon-
dent or the County Planning Commission, did not affect 
a "taking" of the Appellants' property in 1961. The outer 
limits of time in which subdivision approval could be with-
held under the Ordinance was one year from the date it 
was invoked. Under the facts extant in the case, therefore, 
delay could not have been protracted beyond January 10, 
1962. If Appellants had petitioned at the latter time for 
approval of their plat, the Planning Commission would 
have been without aid to withhold ratification. But Ap-
pellants did not return to that Agency as was their right. 
Not until May of 1963, some sixteen months subsequent, 
did they again petition the Planning Commission for ap-
proval of the subdivision plan. 
But there are several other things Appellants did not 
do during 1961, 1962 and the first five months of 1963, 
which are also obstacles in their path. They could have 
appealed the Planning Commission decision of January 
1961, to the County Commission and ultimately to the Dis-
trict Court. 57-5-3 U. C. A., 1953 as amended; 78-3-4 U. 
C. A., 1953. They did neither. A mandamus action could 
have been filed against the Planning Commission to ap-
prove or reject the subdivision plan. Rule 65B(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Such was not done. Appellants 
could have, in a direct action against Salt Lake County, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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attacked the validity and constitutionality of the Ordinance 
9-7-3, on the ground that the one year restraint constituted 
a "taking" of land without compensation in contravention 
of State and Federal Constitutions. That remedy would 
have given to Appellants a decision as to which they now 
urge entitlement. 
Rather than pursue any of the foregoing, Appellants 
choose presently to rest their cause on an attack upon the 
Ordinance in this proceeding.* Such an attack is collateral 
to the issues and the parties before the Court and is not 
permitted where opportunity otherwise existed to raise the 
question directly. The Massachusetts Supreme Court in 
the eminent domain suit of Robinson v. Commonwealth, 
335 Mass. 630, 141 N. E. 2d 727 (1957) states the rule: 
"* * * The Petitioner contended that these 
zoning ordinances were invalid and offered to show 
through one Warner * * * that as applied to 
the parcels in question the Ordinances were invalid 
* * *. The only issue in this case is the ruling 
excluding such evidence of value. 
"There was no error. 
"The Petitioner had ample opportunity to at-
tack directly the Ordinances if he had desired to do 
so. He could have filed a petition in the Land Court. 
* * *, or he could have filed a suit for declara-
tory relief in the Superior Court * * *, to de-
termine the validity of the Ordinances, * * * 
(citing authorities); but in our opinion he could not 
*The bulk of Appellants' Brief (pp. 22-27) is devoted to 
decisions wherein statutes and ordinances were found un-
constitutional for one or more reasons. 
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A 
at the trial of the petition for land damages against 
the Commonwealth attack the zoning ordinances, 
(citing authorities)." 
Also, see Bowling Green-Warren County Airport Bd. 
v. Long, 364 S. W. 2d 167 (Ky.), Nichols on Eminent Do-
main, Vol. 4, P. 238, §12.322 to the same effect. 
(a) Under the facts of the case, a "taking" of 
Appellants' property did not occur. 
Apart from the County Ordinance, Appellants seem 
to argue that the request made by the Respondent of the 
Planning Commission to delay plat approval was, ipso 
facto, a "taking" of their property. That is hard to do in 
the face of a series of cases stemming from this Court, all 
demanding of a contrary result. State of Utah v. Peek, 
1 U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953); State Road Commission 
v. Danielson, 122 Utah 220, 247 P. 2d 900 (1952); Salt 
Lake & U. R. Co. v. Schramm, 56 Utah 53, 189 Pac. 90 
(1920); Oregon Shortline R. Co. v. Jones, 29 Utah 147, 
80 Pac. 732 (1905). While the Court has more often than 
not defined what was not rather than what was a "taking", 
the precedent nevertheless established is a death blow to 
Appellants' appeal. The most recent decision rejecting Ap-
pellants' argument is State of Utah v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 
265 P. 2d 630 (1953), a suit involving the condemnation 
of unimproved land. Therein, it was contended that by the 
filing of the complaint in condemnation, development of 
the property was foreclosed, that the tract was effectively 
seized by the condemnor, and that accordingly, a construc-
tive "taking" of the land had occurred requiring the pay-
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ment of interest on the judgment awarded from the date 
of service of summons. The State did not assume posses-
sion of the premises, pendente lite. It was the holding of 
the Court that interest, prior to the date of judgment, was 
not due, since there was no "taking" until actual possession 
by the condemnor. It was said: 
«* * * Appellants contend, (1) that the 
court improperly refused to allow interest on their 
judgment from the date of service of summons in 
the action, * * *. 
«* * * Appellants are not entitled to inter-
est on the judgment prior to the time when actual 
possession was taken. This court has uniformly so 
held. * * *" 
The Court noted the argument of the landowners (ad-
vanced in this case) that failure to allow interest on the 
judgment from the time of service of summons, constituted 
a "taking" counter to constitutional guarantees: 
«* * * Appellants further argue that fail-
ure to allow such interest constitutes a taking of 
private property for a public use without just com-
pensation in violation of Article I, Sections 7 and 
22 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth and 
Fifth Amendments of the Federal Constitution. 
The argument was rejected and the principle affirmed 
that interest in condemnation is payable only from the date 
of possession of the premises: 
"Appellants have cited no case and we have 
found none which holds that where under the state 
law the taking occurs when the possession of the 
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property is actually surrendered, and not when the 
suit was commenced, that the failure to allow inter-
est from the time of the commencement of the ac-
tion constitutes a violation of these constitutional 
provisions, but a number of courts, including the 
Supreme Court of the United States, have held to 
the contrary. So we will adhere to our previous 
rule that interest is recoverable only from the time 
of taking possession of the property. * * *" 
While the Peek decision is the more contemporary of 
the cases holding to the rule, the primogenitor is Oregon 
Shortline R. Co. v. Jones, 29 Utah 147, 80 Pac. 732 (1905). 
Substantively, the claim made there is that voiced by the 
Appellants here: 
«* * * Under Section 3599, appellants urge 
that the right to compensation accrues and is due 
on the date of the service of summons, and because 
thereof, and because no improvements put upon the 
property subsequent to that date shall be included 
in the assessment of compensation of damages, 
there is, when the summons is served, such an in-
terference with the full enjoyment and ordinary 
benefits of the property by the owner, and such an 
invasion of his rights thereto, as to amount in legal 
effect, to a taking, within the meaning of the Con-
stitution, providing that 'private property shall not 
be taken or damages for public use without just 
compensation/ And it is claimed, as the property 
was taken on that date, and as compensation there-
for then became due, appellants were entitled to in-
terest thereon from the date of the service of sum-
mons to verdict, less rents and other benefits of 
possession received by them covering the same per-
1 f\ri •« * *«* *** 
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As in the case at hand, the issue in Jones was not whether 
there was a "taking"; it was rather, at what point did the 
"taking" occur. After discourse on the decisions of other 
jurisdictions, this Court stated that under the laws of Utah, 
a "taking" is not present unless there be entry or occupa-
tion by the condemning body: 
«* * * Considering again our statute, it is 
quite clear it excludes any claim to interest, at least 
such as is here made. It says in plain terms that the 
'actual value at that date (service of summons) 
shall be the measure of compensation for all prop-
erty to be actually taken/ etc.; that is, the Legisla-
ture has said the actual value of the land—no more, 
no less—shall be the compensation to be assessed. 
* * * 
"When the statute says the actual value of the 
land to be actually taken shall be the measure of 
compensation, and that plaintiff shall have final 
order of condemnation upon the payment of the sum 
of money assessed, it has excluded all other condi-
tions. San Fran &. S. J. V. Ry. Co. v. Leviston, 134 
Cal. 412, 66 Pac. 473. To allow appellants' claim 
of interest to prevail, we are obliged to read some-
thing into the statute not found there. Nor does it 
come within any of the rules of the cases where in-
terest has been allowed. Here there has been no 
entry or occupation of the property. Nor was there 
any time prior to the verdict of the jury when the 
amount of plaintiff's liability had been determined. 
Nor was there any time when it could have taken 
possession and given a writ of assistance therefor 
until final judgment and order of condemnation. 
And the authorities seem to be that one or more of 
these things must be shown to entitle the landowner 
to interest. * * *" 
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If it be the law of the case that a "taking" is not pres-
ent by the filing of a complaint or service of process, it is 
magic to say that the request made by the Respondent to 
the County Planning Commission herein was a "taking". 
The facts in Peek and Jones are much the more conclusive 
and drastic upon the land and its owners than the facts 
which Appellants bring to this appeal. If the Road Com-
mission in January of 1961, had filed its complaint in con-
demnation and served process, that act would have pro-
duced far more serious consequences than the request ac-
tually made. Yet, under the authorities cited, a "taking" 
actual or constructive, would not have transpired. Unless 
this Court is willing to overturn the precedent of Peek and 
Jones, those decisions are dispositive of Appellants' appeal. 
We would add that there are varied instances when 
a public agency would be deemed to have "taken" private 
property even though there be no intentional or conscious 
occupation. The constant flooding of private land, the de-
positing of materials and the severing of water supply, are 
examplars of activity which might qualify as a construc-
tive "taking", even though proceedings in Eminent Domain 
are not pending or contemplated. But there must be some 
ouster of physical possession in addition to impairment in 
the use and enjoyment of the land in order that a "taking" 
exist. Nichols, in his work on Eminent Domain, Volume 
2, Page 372, Sec. 6.1(1) inventories the conditions which 
are necessary to a constructive "taking": 
\j "* * * Each case must be decided on its 
}*l own merits until, by the gradual process of judicial 
exclusion and inclusion, it is possible to say on 
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which side of the line any given injury to private 
property rights may be said to fall. In a general 
way, however, it may be said that when an inter-
ference with the use and enjoyment of land that 
would be actionable at common law is effected un-
der legal authority and as an incident of the con-
struction of a public improvement, and consists of 
actual entry upon land and its devotion to public 
use for more than a momentary period, or of an 
injury of such a character as substantially to oust 
the owner from the possession of the land and to 
deprive him of all beneficial use thereof, there is 
a taking of property in the constitutional sense, 
whether there has been any formal condemnation or 
not." 
Those conditions are not here present. 
(b) Authorities cited by Appellants are not rele-
vant. 
A preponderance of the cases which Appellants urge 
as supportive of their cause involve interruption and ouster 
of physical possession of the land. Thus, a flooding of the 
owners fruit grove (L. L. Richards v. United States, 282 
F. 2d 901 (Ct. of CI. 1960)) and the firing of cannon over 
private property (Portsmouth Harbor Land and Hotel 
Company v. United States, 260 U. S. 327, 43 S. Ct. 135, 
67 L. Ed. 287 (1922)) fit within the inventory of condi-
tions as prescribed by Nichols, supra. They are not applic-
able to this case. 
Several decisions which Appellants cite concern the 
constitutionality of statutes where it was found that the 
intent of the legislation was to permanently freeze all de-
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velopment of property. Each of those suits deal with a 
direct attack upon the statute or ordinance. There are at 
least three reasons why those decisions are not germane. 
First, Appellants have never attacked the validity of the 
County Ordinance, 9-7-3, other than collaterally in this suit. 
Secondly, each of the cases entailed a permanent dedication 
of land. Thirdly, it was determined in several cases (Apps/ 
Brief 24-25) that the zoning agencies had not acted in good 
faith. The good faith of the Respondent in this suit, is not 
only undenied, but admitted by all. 
The rule to which Appellants fasten their hope is set 
out on page 19 of their Brief. Therein it is said, "Any lim-
itation on the free use and enjoyment of property constitutes 
a taking of property." Of course, under that framework, 
zoning regulations, better yet, all police power activity 
would be tabbed as a constructive "taking". Fortunately, 
the law does not foresee such a result. 
(c) Appellants' contention is a non-sequitur. 
But there are even larger reasons why Appellants' ap-
peal is to fail. They urge that a "taking" transpired in 
January of 1961. A "taking" of what? Not of the 12 
acres ultimately condemned in July, 1963. If a taking oc-
curred at all in 1961, it was of the entire 35 acres, for Ap-
pellants' claim is that the development of the entire prop-
erty was frustrated and delayed. By claiming a "taking" 
of the entire ground on the one hand, and the right to com-
pensation only as to a part thereof on the other, a paradox 
is created. ^ (\ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
If as contended, the request made by the Respondent 
of the Planning Commission in 1961 constituted a "taking", 
then Appellants are entitled to the market value of the 
property at that time. But Appellants confirm the trial 
Court in determining that market value is to be adjudged i $ 
as of July, 1963, two and one-half years subsequent to the »
 | / r 
time in which they claim their land was "taken." It is fairy£r 0 
to say that the 1963 date reflects higher and appreciated \A?^J^ 
land values. The argument is a non-sequitur. 
POINT III. 
ANSWERING A P P E L L A N T S ' POINT II, 
LANDOWNERS HAVE ALREADY RECOV-
ERED THE FULL MEASURE OF COMPEN-
SATION UNDER THE LAW. 
Appellants, while confessing the weakness of Point I 
of their Brief, allege under Point II special damages be-
yond that awarded in the main eminent domain trial. En-
compassed within this claim are the loss of investment and 
interest money ($29,312.95), real taxes assessed for the 
years 1961 through 1964 ($1,189.20), salaries, insurance 
premiums, water service, and other costs. Only gasoline 
and travel expenses to and from the property appear to be 
eliminated. 
Compensation to which Appellants are due is governed 
by the eminent domain Statute, 78-34-10 U. C. A., 1953. 
That law is implementive of the Constitutional mandate, 
Article 1, Section 22, requiring the payment of just com-
pensation for the taking of private property. Logan City 
> 
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Board of Education v. Croft, 13 U. 2d 310, 373 P. 2d 697 
(1962); Sidney Stevens Implement Co. v. Ogden City, 83 
Utah 578, 33 P. 2d 181 (1934). It obligates the trial court 
to find: 
The fair market value of the land and improve-
ments taken (Section (1) ) ; 
Damages to remaining property caused by the 
severance of the portion acquired and the 
construction of the public improvement (Sec-
tion (2) ) ; 
Damage to land, no part of which is taken, con-
sequentially caused by the taking of other 
property (Section (3) ) . 
At the trial in this matter, the jury and Court found the 
facts to be: 
1) Market value of total tract (35 acres) 
before taking _ $274,645.00 
2) Market value of remaining tract (23 
acres) after taking 144,645.00 
Total Award (Just Compensation) $130,000.00 
The special verdict and judgment were considerate of 
Section (1) and Section (2) damage under 78-34-10. Sec-
tion (3) consequential damage, as defined by this Court, 
was not raised by the evidence of Appellants or embodied 
within the judgment. Logan City Board of Education v. 
Croft, 13 U. 2d 310, 373 P. 2d 697 (1962); Southern Pacific 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
Co. v. Arthur, 10 U. 2d 306, 352 P. 2d 693 (1960). 
Thus, the Appellants purchased the 35 acres in 1959 for 
$170,000.00. The judgment in condemnation was entered 
in the sum of $130,000.00 for the acquisition of 12 of those 
acres by Respondent in 1963. 
The damages to which Appellants lay claim have no 
relation to the land value under investigation, either before 
or after the control date. They have their clearest form in 
contemplated loss of contract bargain, loss of profits, frus-
tration of future plans and damage in personam to the 
Appellants, all of which this Court has once pronounced to 
be non-compensable as a matter of law. State Road Com-
mission v. Hansen, et ux., 14 U. 2d 305, 383 P. 2d 
917 (1963); State of Utah v. Bird & Evans, Inc., and 
Tedesco, 4 U. 2d 31, 286 P. 2d 785 (1955); State of Utah 
v. Tedesco, 4 U. 2d 248, 291 P. 2d 1028 (1956). See also 
Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 2, p. 185, Sec. 5.76(2), 
and West Virgmia Pulp & Paper Co. v. United States, 200 
F. 2d 100 (4 C. A. 1952). Those damages which inure to 
and partake of the property itself, were fully adjudicated 
at the main trial by jury. To recognize Appellants' claims 
as valid would be to recognize double recovery. 
(a) Appellants' claims constitute separate causes 
of action against the sovereign, and, in all 
events, may not be recovered in this pro-
ceeding. 
Appellants assume for this Point that the request of 
Respondent to the Planning Commission in 1961 was not 
a "taking" of their property. That being the case, their 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
claim for resulting injury must qualify within one of the 
conventional forms of action, ex delicto or ex contractu. 
Do the claims sound in tort, negligence or intentional, or 
contract, express or implied? One is hard pressed in re-
sponding that the action is in contract, for the rudiments 
of an agreement, express or implied, are quite absent. A 
closer course is to hold that the claims are ex delicto, either 
negligent or intentional. In either event, they have their 
genesis not in or as a result of the condemnation suit in-
itiated in 1963, but in the prior and unrelated acts of the 
Respondent in 1961. In that capacity, the claims are 
against the sovereign and are independent of this proceed-
ing. The law is too well settled in this jurisdiction for 
more than academic debate that the sovereign is immune 
from suit at law for tortious damage. Fairclough, et al. v. 
State Road Commission, et al., 10 U. 2d 417, 354 P. 2d 105 
(1960); Springville Banking Co. v. C. Taylor Burton and 
State Road Commission, 10 U. 2d 100, 349 P. 2d 157 
(1960); State of Utah v. Bird & Evans, Inc., and Tedesco, 
4 U. 2d 31, 286 P. 2d 785 (1955); Campbell Bldg. Co. v. 
State Road Commission, 95 Utah 242, 70 P. 2d 857 (1927). 
We are quick to add that sovereign immunity is neither 
waived by the action in condemnation which Respondent 
filed in 1963, State Road Commission v. Parker, 13 U. 2d 
65, 368 P. 2d 585 (1962); Commissioner v. Berke County, 
364 Pa. 447, 72 A. 2d 129; Moore on Federal Practice, Vol. 
3, page 43, Section 13.15 (2), nor is the State of Utah, by 
such filing, thereby subjected to all grievances which the 
landowners may harbor. School District No. 2 v. United 
States, 229 F. 2d 681 (6 C. A. 1956). In State Road Com-
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mission v. Parker, supra, it was held that a counter-claim 
in tort stands on no better footing against the State than 
an original complaint at law. In both instances, the rem-
edy, if any, was said to rest with the State Board of Ex-
aminers. The trial Court, in the suit at bar, viewed the 
claims of Appellant in a parallel light. (Conclusions of Law 
No. 3, 4 and 5, R. 74A, 75). 
POINT IV. 
ANSWERING APPELLANTS' POINT III, EN-
GINEERING AND PLANNING COSTS FOR A 
PROPOSED SUBDIVISION ARE NOT RECOV-
ERABLE IN EMINENT DOMAIN. 
(a) Such costs do not constitute an improvement 
to the realty under 78-34-10 (1), U. C. A., 
1953. 
Point III of Appellants' Brief is unimpressive. It is 
therein said that expenses incurred in devising plans for 
the proposed subdivision of the condemned acreage are 
recoverable as an "improvement appertaining to the realty" 
under Section (1) of 78-23-10. There is no precedent in 
the law for such a statement. 
The Statute is plain in its meaning that an "improve-
ment" requires that some physical and permanent change 
be evidenced. To classify as an improvement, the asset 
must be so attached to the realty that, under Property Law, 
it would pass to a grantee as an appurtenance. Such is 
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implied from the phrase in the statute "and all improve-
ments thereon appertaining to the realty." 
Subdivision plans and schemes for property develop-
ment are not admissible, much less comparable in eminent 
domain. In Redondo Beach School District of Los Angeles 
County v. Flodine, 314 P. 2d 581 (Cal. 1957), the rule was 
said to be: 
"Coming to appellant's last contention, appar-
ently appellant attempted to subdivide the property 
in some way or other and ultimately to subdivide 
all of it, but the usual rule in eminent domain pro-
ceedings is that a proposed plan for the develop-
ment of the property proposed to be taken is not 
material on the issue of market value." 
Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 4, p. 152, Sec. 12.314 
is of the same opinion: 
"Evidence may be adduced showing only the 
naturally adapted uses of the property in its pres-
ent condition. The owner's actual plans or hopes 
for the future are completely irrelevant. Such mat-
ters are regarded as too remote and speculative to 
merit consideration." 
The contention of Appellants should be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
The claim for relief of Appellants is not borne out by 
the facts. The acts of Respondent in December of 1960 did 
not produce a "taking" of Appellants' property. The de-
mands for special damages are not well taken, the damage 
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being non-compensable. Accordingly, the Order of Invol-
untary Dismissal entered by the lower court should be, by 
this Court, affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN, 
Attorney General, 
RONALD N. BOYCE, 
Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR., 
Special Assistant 
Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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